# Unexploded ordnance risk for Safety Coordinators \| Mela

Source: https://www.mela.work/en/blog/safety-coordinator-unexploded-ordnance-risk

Language: en

Learn how Safety Coordinators assess unexploded ordnance risks during excavation, plan clearance and document decisions under Italian safety law.

## The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

How long does war last after a conflict has ended? Unfortunately, for a very long time. For years, the land retains the devastation of war and, if care is not taken, can still cause destruction today. With Dr Adriano Ciani, we discuss the risk assessment that the CSP must carry out because of the likely presence of unexploded ordnance that could be found in the ground during excavation work.

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance



Today we are launching a new space dedicated to Safety Coordinators. Our guest is Dr **[Adriano Ciani](http://www.cianiconsulenti.it/wp/)**, who will discuss many fascinating aspects of his work, and above all how to make it more efficient, simpler and free from the risk of error.

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

*Adriano Ciani is the owner of [Studio Tecnico Specialistico Ciani Consulenti di Udine](http://www.cianiconsulenti.it/wp/), certified to ISO 9001:2015. The firm has operated throughout Italy for 25 years, with a particular focus on **services relating to Architecture and Engineering** and **Technical and Economic Consultancy for Contracts for Public Authorities** or **Concessionaires of Public Authorities** located in the Triveneto area.*



*Dr Ciani has developed **a method** based on a **structured process** comprising approximately 23 stages **for carrying out the work of the CSP** – Safety Coordinator for the Design Stage – **and CSE** – Safety Coordinator during the Execution Stage.*



*The method has evolved over the years and has been validated by two certification bodies (DNV and RINA). It was subsequently adopted as good practice in their procedures by several Contracting Authorities and Technical-Professional Associations.*



*The **Ciani Method** enables any CSE to find **the fundamental work guidelines** and prepare minutes without PEC.*



***The simplified version of the Ciani Method developed for Mela comprises 8 main steps, with the aim of resolving the management problems faced by CSPs/CSEs.***

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

*Bomb disposal experts examining a bomb*



## The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance



It is said that the past is not forgotten and that what happened yesterday inevitably affects today. We are technicians, as you know, not writers or philosophers, but today **Dr Ciani will talk to us about the past** – and about how to prevent what happened in our territory during the two world wars from affecting the present, particularly during excavation for public and private works.



The figures (which are striking\!) clearly show the scale of the issue. At the **end of the Second World War**, leaving aside other types of ordnance, military sources estimated that **approximately 37.900 tonnes of unexploded aerial bombs** remained across the country. **At present**, approximately **15.000 tonnes of unexploded aerial bombs** are believed to remain across the country.



> One example? In 2015 alone, GenioDIfe bomb disposal experts carried out 145 operations to remove and detonate unexploded ordnance at as many construction sites in Friuli Venezia Giulia.

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

**Anti-aircraft guns – 1a World War – Historical photograph**



## The risk of unexploded ordnance: the Safety Coordinator’s work



The **[Law 177/2012](https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2012-10-18&atto.codiceRedazionale=012G0200)** (partially in force since 02/11/2012, but fully in force from 26/06/2016 following an extension introduced by Law no. 21 converting the Milleproroghe Decree) substantially amended Italian Legislative Decree 81/08 and subsequent amendments – the Italian Consolidated Safety and Health at Work Act (Testo Unico sulla Sicurezza e Salute sul Lavoro) – concerning occupational safety in the clearance of unexploded ordnance.



**What changes were introduced** for Clients, Design Coordinators and Contractors carrying out and executing the works?



“Law 177/2012 supplements Articles 28, 91, 100, 104, and Annexes XI and XV of Legislative Decree 81/2008 and subsequent amendments by requiring the Design Coordinator – CSP **to assess the risk posed by the possible presence of unexploded ordnance that may be found during excavation work** on temporary or mobile construction sites, within the Safety and Coordination Plan (PSC),” explains Ciani.



“The **risk assessment** for unexploded ordnance that could be found during excavation work on construction sites (VOB) is therefore their responsibility. If **the CSP** considers **the risk to be real** – both the likelihood of finding ordnance and the extent of the damage caused by its detonation – the **prior clearance of the land** where the site is located must be carried out.”



> In short, the CSP bears a major responsibility – one for which they may not even have the means to act as effectively as possible.

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

*Bombs from the 1a World War found in Friuli*



## The process of checking, clearing and, where necessary, making unexploded ordnance safe



“Once the CSP has identified a possible risk from unexploded ordnance and clearance of the land is therefore required\*\*, the Client appoints a specialised company\*\* meeting the requirements set out in **Article 104, paragraph 4 bis of the TUSL**,” explains Ciani.



The appointed company must be registered in the register introduced by **Decree no. 82/2015** and have suitable technical and financial capacity, appropriate equipment and staff holding the qualifications required to carry out systematic clearance activities. It must also be registered in a special register established at the Ministry of Defence.



The **prior and systematic clearance activity (BB)** then takes place on the basis of a binding opinion from the competent **Military Authority**. This opinion will cover the specific technical rules to be followed, taking into account the geographical location, the type of land and the work or project to be carried out.



If a bomb or other unexploded ordnance is found during clearance work, it must be uncovered and left where it is. Only **GenioDIfe bomb disposal experts** are authorised to detonate or move it.

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

*Different types of unexploded ordnance found in the area*



## The risk of unexploded ordnance: a method for avoiding assessment errors



The first question is: **how** **can the CSP know whether there is a possibility of finding underground aerial bombs,** mines, artillery shells, grenades, rockets, hand grenades and unexploded small-arms ammunition dating from the **2a or 1a World War** (events that took place from 80 to more than 100 years ago)?



“Exactly. The Design Coordinator bears significant responsibility and **a series of duties**. First, they assess the risk of unexploded ordnance being found during excavation work on construction sites **(VOB)** and must then report the results in the Safety and Coordination Plan,” Ciani reiterates. **But they need a reliable algorithm**.



Let us now look at the cases the CSP may face, based on the VOB outcome:



- **1° Case**: the Design Coordinator (CSP) **does not intend to proceed** with prior clearance (BB) of the site where the construction site is located


- **2° Case**: the Design Coordinator (CSP) **intends to proceed** **fully or partially** with prior clearance (BB) of the site where the construction site is located



“In case 2, before estimating the related safety costs to be included in the Safety and Coordination Plan, **the CSP should** **consult** the offices of the competent **Military Authority**, to **avoid overestimating or underestimating those costs**. They must then **identify the exact timescale** for carrying out the prior and systematic clearance so that it can be included **in the works schedule.**



- **[Download the Algorithm for Assessing (Residual) Risks from the Possible Discovery of Unexploded Ordnance on Sites Involving Excavation Work](/media/downloads/002ce341-9faa-534b-b608-5ce68404b726)**


- **[Download an Example of a Price List (EPU – BB) and Safety Cost Estimate for Ordnance Clearance Activities (BB)](/media/downloads/c382beb4-2dfc-5856-bf37-fab5a0c66c02)**

Aerial photograph from the 2 World War

Aerial photograph of bombing during the 2 World War

*Aerial photographs of Allied bombing – 2a World War*



## So far, so good. But what risks does the CSP face if their assessments are incorrect?



“The **risks are genuinely serious and significant**,” explains Ciani. “If they decide not to proceed with clearance and an item of ordnance is found, the consequences, as you can easily imagine, will be disastrous. If, on the other hand, they proceed with clearance and nothing is ultimately found, they risk incurring **financial liability**, which is also a terrible predicament.”



How, then, can they proceed to ensure that they act as effectively as possible and make the right choice? “The legislation gives only an instruction, not a methodology. The National Council of Engineers has only partially addressed the issue, because no analytical methodology has been implemented. To complete the picture, professional liability policies do not automatically cover this obligation,” Ciani continues.



“For this reason, as far back as 2016, I told myself that **every CSP needs basic support**. Because, quite apart from the worst-case scenarios we have just considered, it is essential for the coordinator to have **a precise understanding of the costs of ordnance clearance**. If the coordinator is unfamiliar with the specifications, they may make an **underestimated assessment** and therefore risk **a claim from the Contractor**.”



And what if a CSP **forgets to carry out the VOB** or carries it out only partially? At the very least, they incur the penalties set out in Article 158 of Legislative Decree 81/08 and subsequent amendments, with a fine of **2.800 to 7.100 euros or imprisonment for 3 to 6 months**. **And that is without considering the consequences if the explosion of the ordnance causes injuries**; the provisions **of the criminal code** would also apply.”



> The coordinator must assess the risks but needs a reliable algorithm. That is why I developed a complete methodology based on a reliable and effective algorithm.



So how can we give the Coordinator **the right formula** for determining whether ordnance clearance is genuinely necessary, and **help them avoid liability** for any financial damage?

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

*Machine guns – 1° World War              **Allied bombing – 2° World War***



## The risk of unexploded ordnance during excavation: the stages of the Ciani Method



The method involves several stages, beginning with an examination of **maps of the areas and historical sources**:



- First, a **historical investigation** must be carried out **in order to** establish whether the area where excavation is planned may have been bombed or affected by military operations during the two world wars. The sources will therefore include:


- Memories of residents and associations


- Bibliographical sources on local history


- Diary sources (published or held in public archives)


- Sources held in State Archives: archives of the Provincial Committees for Air-Raid Protection


- Archives of the Prefectures


- International bibliographical sources


- Sources held in civilian and military archives in Allied countries (microfilm of bombing raids)


- Specialist websites


- National Aerial Photography Archive


- **The data obtained from these sources must be georeferenced on current maps** (for this purpose, **Google Maps** may be used), preparing a detailed technical drawing showing the areas that were bombed (and the type and quantity of bombs dropped), the position of anti-aircraft guns (the characteristics and range of their weapons), the position of strategic military sites and strategic targets, as well as the location of our construction site and the various correlations.


- **Finally**, **the VOB risk will be assessed using the algorithm** – that is, the possibility of finding unexploded ordnance – **with different colours on the technical drawing** according to the result, showing **the level of risk** at the construction site where excavation is taking place and reporting the conclusions in the PSC. The VOB risk may be: very high (red), high (brown), medium-high (orange), medium (yellow) or low (green). On the technical drawing, the construction site area will be outlined with a blue line and divided into areas of 100 square metres each (a black square grid). **Ordnance clearance will not be planned in green areas, meaning areas with low risk**, **whereas it will be planned and estimated by the CSP for the other areas**

The Safety Coordinator and the risk posed by the presence of unexploded ordnance

*Example of a Technical Drawing*



**As can be seen from the example, the effectiveness of the method makes it possible, on an informed basis, to establish whether ordnance clearance should be required and where it should be carried out.**



Ciani concludes with one final general observation: “**There cannot be unexploded ordnance** in a layer of **ground that has previously been worked**, in a layer where screened material has been deposited, **or where there is rock**. The VOB must therefore take account of the possible **presence of underground structures/utility services**.



Moreover, **there cannot be**, in the ground, an unexploded aerial bomb at a depth **greater than 7 metres** unless it was deliberately buried.”
